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1

JUDGE BENCH:

And we'll move now to our 10:30 case, State against Rosa-Re. Did I say
that correctly?

ATD:

I'm sorry?

JUDGE BENCH:

Did I say that correctly?

ATD:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE BENCH:

All right. We have Ms. Jones here representing the appellant. Would you
like to reserve any of your 15 minutes?

8

ATD:

Yes, Your Honor, I'd like to reserve four minutes if I may.

9

JUDGE BENCH:

Four?

10

ATD:

Yes, Your Honor.

11

JUDGE BENCH:

I'll try to help you.

12

ATD:

May it please the Court, counsel. This case concerns discrimination in the

13

jury selection process. The issue is referred to as a Batson challenge.

14

Under Baison v Kentucky and its progeny, the United States Supreme

15

Court has ruled that a prosecutor may not use peremptory strikes for
1

gender or racial reasons. In addition, in J.E.B. v. Alabama the United
States Supreme Court ruled in that case, where the defendant was male,
where the issues in the case were gender sensitive - for example, sexual
harassment, sexual assault, paternity, domestic violence - the prosecutor's
pattern of removing men from the jury violated the Equal Protection
provision of the federal constitution. In this case, we maintain that the
prosecutor discriminated for gender reasons when he used three of his four
peremptory strikes to remove all of the men who presumptively would sit
on the jury panel in a case for sexual assault. Now in a case....
You also, at least the defense, the defense also removed the same number
of men. Am I right about that?
The defense removed three men and one woman, and the State has
conceded that the defendant's reason for removing men was legitimate. In
addition, the rule in J.E.B., the rule in Bat son, precludes a prosecutor - the
State - from engaging in discriminatory conduct. So the fact that the
defendant removed men is actually irrelevant. I would refer the Court to
J.E.B. again: J.E.B. v. Alabama. In that case the defendant removed all
women, and that was not relevant to the Court's analysis in finally
concluding that the State there had discriminated for gender reasons.
Under the Batson line of cases there's a three part test that federal
Courts and Utah courts apply to determine if there has been discrimination
in the jury selection process. Under the first step of the test the person
raising the Batson challenge - in this case, the defendant - is required to

2

1

present a prima facie case of discrimination. Here there is really no

2

relevant dispute about the first step. The prosecutor used 75 percent of his

3

peremptory challenges against the three men who presumptively would sit

4

on the jury. It's a case where the defendant is male, the victim is male,

5

and the case concerned gender sensitive issues. It was a sexual assault

6

case. There's no....

7

JUDGE MCHIJGH:

Let me interrupt you, where both the defendant and the victim are male,

8

does it really weigh one way or another to have men on the jury or not on

9

the jury?

10

ATD:

It is certainly still a gender sensitive case. I think men tend to be less

11

sympathetic to victims who claim sexual harassment and sexual assault.

12

They tend to be more cautious in weighing the information. I am making

13

generalizations, but it's these very generalizations that should not be

14

weighing in on the prosecutor's decisions in making peremptory strikes.

15

JUDGE DAVIS:

Does it matter anyway in this case, because didn't the prosecutor then just

16

jump right in and give an explanation without challenging whether there

17

was a prima facie Bat son challenge?

18

ATD:

And that is the second step, Your Honor. The prosecutor is required to

19

give an explanation. Under the law the explanation is required to be

20

neutral, clear and specific, related to the case, and legitimate. And in this

21

case the prosecutor's explanations were none of those things.

22
23

Under the third step of the Bat son analysis, the trial court then
considers whether there was discrimination in the selection process. The

3

United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller-El v. Dretke, and in Johnson
v. California, that the question in the third step really focuses on the
persuasiveness of the prosecutor's explanation. In the J.E.B. case the
United States Supreme Court stated that the prosecutor's explanations
must be exceedingly persuasive.
But this Balson process needs to be concluded prior to the jury being
sworn and the remaining venire being discharged. Isn't that the thrust of
Valdez IP.
The thrust of Valdez II is the defense needs to raise the issue before the
jury is empanelled and the rest of the venire is dismissed. And the trial
court certainly needs to resolve the issue quickly. Where the trial court
doesn't do that, that's trial court error.
So procedurally, at least, what this case boils down to is whose
responsibility was it that the Balson process was not concluded one way or
another, prior to the jury being sworn and the rest of the venire being
excused, because at that point in time the trial judge couldn't do anything
about it anyway.
Well, and the answer to that question, Your Honor, is that the trial court is
ultimately responsible for seeing that the Balson issue is resolved. It's the
trial court that must make the quick determination under the clear
guidelines of Balson, a process that is intended to give transparency to the
prosecutor's reasons for removing veniremen from the panel. It's the trial
court that holds that responsibility. I would refer the Court to State v.

4

Pharris, Stale v. Cannon - cases decided by this Court - where the trial
court simply skipped over that second step; skipped over that second step
and this Court remanded for further proceedings under the Batson
analysis. Now how is it different if the trial court skips over the step or
waits until after it empanels the jury and then uses that as a reason to deny
the Batson challenge?
Let me focus you on footnote number 19 in Valdez II, which basically says
that the Redd decision would be decided differently after Valdez II And
the facts of Redd are very similar to what we're dealing with here.
Doesn't - and Valdez II is after the cases that you've just referred us to -1
mean, don't we have pretty clear marching orders from the Utah Supreme
Court about whose responsibility it is to see that the entire analysis is
completed before the venire is discharged?
And I don't know how that responsibility could completely fall on the
defendant when he is required to make the objection and present the prima
facie case and then the trial court - conducting the proceedings - the trial
court who knows the Batson analysis, needs to move on to that second
step with the prosecution. The defendant has done what he needs to do
and under Redd v. Negley - I think is the name of the case - I think that
case is unclear. But there the parties approached the bench and it appears
that the defendant, I believe it was the defendant, asked to reserve the
opportunity to make an objection. The defendant didn't make the
objection; asked for the opportunity to reserve some time to make that

5

1

objection. So that case is distinguishable from this case where the defense

2

in this case, in fact, approached the bench, raised the Batson issue,

3

specifically said "we're challenging the prosecutor's peremptory strikes

4

under Baison ", identified gender as the reason, indicated that the

5

seriousness of the charges required it, and these are sexual assault charges.

6

That's what the defense was required to do, and that's what the defense

7

did in this case.

8

JUDGE DAVIS:

9

basically passing on the jury subsequently without the Baison issue having

10
11

Well, so far so good. But what about the effect of the defense attorney

been resolved?
ATD:

Well, that is really a pro forma statement. We see that time and again in

12

trials. And you're referring to the point, Your Honor, when the judge

13

asked "Is this the jury that you have selected?" And defense counsel

14

indicates that it is. In fact, the defendant had not objected to any of the

15

individuals sitting on the jury, the defendant had no objection to women

16

sitting on the jury; the full objection here is that the prosecutor allowed

17

discrimination to taint the selection process. That objection had been

18

made at that point. The issue was not waived by that statement, it's

19

simply a pro forma statement. It's the sort of statement we see when a

20

losing party signs the form of the order. That does not constitute waiver;

21

it's SLpro forma statement.

22
23

JUDGE MCIIUGII: Well, but in that case it's you approve as to form and reserve as to
substance, I mean, that's what people do when they approve an order

6

1

where they lost. In this case, there's a reason why we go through these

2

steps and it isn't just pro forma. If you don't agree with the jury you have

3

to, there's no way to fix it once the venire is dismissed, and I think that

4

Valdez IIS that's the whole point of that case is that we don't make

5

objections in the trial court just to make the appellate court happy that

6

we've preserved it. We make objections in the trial court so that the trial

7

judge has a real opportunity to fix the problem before it can't be fixed.

8

ATI):

9

And the trial judge had that opportunity here and failed in two reasons:
failed to immediately resolve the issue and failed to resolve the issue

10

properly. Let's not lose sight of who has the obligation once the defendant

11

makes the objection. The trial court needs to take control of this. And

12

time and again courts have ruled, where the trial court skipped the second

13

step, disregarded the second step, didn't move on to the second step, that

14

requires remand. If the trial court had completely blown the defendant off

15

here, that would require remand in this case. In Batson v. Kentucky the

16

defendant made an objection, the trial court essentially blew the defendant

17

off, rejected it and proceeded with the trial. Batson v. Kentucky was

18

reversed and remanded. That's the situation we have here, a situation

19

where the defendant has made a proper objection and the trial court failed

20

to properly address it and resolve it.

21

JUDGE BENCH:

Two things really at play here. One is the changing landscape with the

22

law. Defense probably would have done it differently if they had the

23

advantage of Valdez II at the time of this trial. That's one part of this. I

7

guess the other pail of it is that to require the defendant to continue to
object here could put him in the position of getting into an argument with
the court. "No, you can't go forward, Your Honor, until you do this." So
there kind of is some interesting conflicting positions here.
Well, I do believe that the defense counsel did all that defense counsel was
required to do in this case. It was then up to the court to resolve it. And
Your Honor is absolutely correct that once defense counsel makes that
objection and the prima facie case, the defendant is not required to debate
it with the court or even debate it with the prosecutor. In Miller-El v.
Dretke, that's precisely what happened. The defense then contested the
prosecutor's explanation and the United States Supreme Court went on to
say that when the prosecutor provided more excuses for removing those
veniremen, it reeked of after-thought.
This is a process that wants to look at the prosecutor's reasons for
striking veniremen, and his original answers are really what is at play and
what is most telling. I can see I'm into my rebuttal time. I'd like to
quickly address the three individuals who were stricken here.
The first was Jed Worley. The prosecutor - under step two explained that he struck Mr. Worley for lack of education. But as we look
at the record under step three, as we look at the explanation in light of the
record, we sec that Mr. Worley didn't say anything about education, he
didn't say where he went to High School, whether he went to college, he
didn't talk about education at all. And in this case the prosecutor didn't

8

ask about it. Well, the United States Supreme Court in Miller-El v Dretke
- in a footnote there - said ''where the prosecutor doesn't ask, it
undermines his explanation".
In addition with respect to the other two jurors, Mr. Tidwell and
Mr. Jensen, they had as much to offer a jury as any person who actually
sat on that jury. They had as much in terms of education, life experience,
life choices, disciplined careers. Yet the prosecutor in this case claims that
he struck Mr. Tidwell because of a gut instinct that Mr. Tidwell had
nothing to offer. This man, Mr. Tidwell, had a college education, he was
an engineer, he was a father, he was a husband, he sat on a jury in the past.
The prosecutor claimed that he struck Mr. Jensen because he had a
personal opinion that Mr. Jensen wouldn't give the matter attention. Mr.
Jensen was a father and a husband, he was a man who went to college for
two years, he was an executive officer for a Utah corporation, he sat on a
jury in the past.
The explanations given by the prosecutor in this case were vague,
ambiguous, they were illegitimate, they were not gender neutral
explanations. And for that reason the explanations constituted a pretext
for discrimination and we're asking this Court to reverse the conviction
for a new trial in light of the Batson violations. And I will reserve my
remaining time for rebuttal.
Two minutes on rebuttal, there if you would.
Thank you, Your Honor.

9

1

JUDGE BENCH:

Ms. Soltis.

2

ATP:

Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court, Christine Soltis

3

appearing on behalf of the State, and counsel. I'd like to just very briefly,

4

I was planning on submitting the timeliness issue on the briefs, because I

5

think that there's so much to talk about in relationship to this case, in

6

relationship to the Balson analysis, that the defendant is proposing. But I

7

would like to just mention this; this is not just & pro forma passing of the

8

jury. If in fact the defendant believes that jurors have been discriminated

9

against and removed from the panel, the panel is not properly empanelled.

10

And the resolution for a Boston is to replace the jurors who were

11

unlawfully removed. So, there is a burden and that's exactly what Valdez

12

// says. We are talking structural error here. This is not simply a remand

13

situation. The defendant is asking this Court to reverse an otherwise valid

14

conviction, and yet all that they have done is the most minimal amount to

15

even raise this issue or to see it resolved at the proper time before the

16

court.

17

JUDGE MCIIUGH: What about counsel's argument that you're in the middle of trial, you very

18

clearly stated you have an objection based on gender discrimination under

19

the Batson/J.E.B. line of cases and the court says, "Okay, fine. I'll get to

20

that later." How much do you have to do? At what point do you risk

21

alienating the court to your client?

22
23

ATP:

Having been a trial attorney - both as a defense attorney and a prosecutor
for many years - I don't think that it's very hard. There is nothing that

10

1

was hostile here, in feet the court kept saying, "Well, okay, is that okay,

2

are you happy now, is this the jury that's okay?" All he had to do at that

3

point is say "Whoops, Your Honor, let me explain. You can't actually

4

release this group. You need to recall this issue." That's all, there was no

5

hostility here. At one point they were up at the bench. That's all he had to

6

say. "No, Your Honor, you really have to do it here." And if he thinks

7

that there's any confusion, you don't get up and invite the court to dismiss

8

the jury, and that's what they did here.

9

Let me turn to the Batson analysis itself, because I think that what

10

the defendant is proposing to this Court is not Batson. It is an

11

interpretation of Batson that derives from four decisions of this Court:

12

Valdez I, which really has no authority at this point and is dicta after Valdz

13

II; State v. Jensen, which did result in a reversal of a conviction; State v.

14

Chatwin which resulted in a reversal of a conviction; and State v. Cannon.

15

Even though Cannon was actually the right result in relationship to that

16

case, but it was kind of the bud that started the Chatwin line of cases,

17

because what Cannon did is transpose factors from step three onto step

18

two, and I'll explain this much more fully as I go on.

19

But the Valdez, Jensen, and Chatwin line of cases, the Chatwin line

20

of cases, they also relieved the defendant of their burden of persuasion and

21

they erroneously stop at step two. What essentially the defendant is

22

asking this Court to do is view a three-part Batson analysis as a two-part

23

Batson analysis. And there are no U.S. Supreme Court cases that permit

11

1

the issue of Batson to be totally resolved at stage two. This is not - and

2

when I say that these cases, Chatwin, Cannon, Valdez 1, and Jensen, are

3

incorrect - this is not simply a situation, as many times where we argue

4

our interpretation of the cases up here and the defense argues theirs, the

5

exact analytical model that the defense is proposing to you has been

6

resoundly and expressly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was

7

rejected in Hernandez v. New York, it was rejected in Plunckett v. Elm,

8

and it was most recently rejected in Johnson v. California. It is also

9

inconsistent with Utah precedent. It is inconsistent with State v Caldwell

10

of the Utah Supreme Court and State v. Iliggenbotham. It is inconsistent

11

with this Court's opinions in State v. Bowman and State v. Merrill. The

12

State is not asking this Court for new law, it is asking for a re-alignment to

13

bring the case law of this Court in conformity with the United States

14

Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court and its prior decisions before

15

Cannon, Jensen, Chatwin, and Valdez L

16

Let me first say one of the most important, I think, and underlying

17

aspects ofBatson analysis, and I think it's what drives all of the Bat son

18

analysis because frankly, the cases can be a bit confusing. I think

19

sometimes that they can be a little careless in their terminology, they don't

20

always clearly define which step they're talking about, whether it's step

21

two or three, unless you closely analyze the cases. But the single factor

22

that resolves all of these cases and brings them into alignment is the

23

agreement by everyone, even in the cases that the defendant cites, that the

12

1

burden of persuasion never leaves the defendant, and I'm using that

2

terminology as the opponent of the strike. Never leaves.

3

And if you bear the risk, the burden of persuasion, you must also

4

bear the risk of non-persuasion. Those two simply cannot be separated. If

5

they carry the burden of persuasion, how can the State ever be at the risk,

6

carry a risk of non-persuasion? The State may fail in providing an

7

explanation under step two. Johnson recognized that. Johnson recognized

8

that the State in Purkett, you could be, it was silly, you could give a

9

frivolous explanation. But the reason why Batson always proceeds to step

10

three is because that is where the burden of persuasion is resolved. That is

11

where Batson is resolved. Steps one and two are simply production

12

stages. In stage one the defendant is to come forward and produce & prima

13

facie case. In step two, ideally the prosecutor should come forward and

14

present a facially neutral explanation. Well, what if they don't, what if

15

they actually just remain silent? What if they simply said, "I don't know, I

16

don't want to answer that question"? Well Johnson addressed that specific

17

scenario. Johnson said even in the hypothetical of a prosecutor remaining

18

totally silent, that does not end the inquiry. And why not? Because the

19

burden of persuasion is with the defendant and the risk of non-persuasion

20

is with the defendant. It is simply a circumstance which goes into the pot

21

of step three. And in step three....

13

1

JUDGE DAVIS:

So even if you don't reach step three, then, you are suggesting that the
burden of persuasion essentially picks up the - or places the burden to get
to step three, on the defendant, is that basically how the argument runs?

ATP:

No. In some ways, yes, Your Honor, but I think it's even simpler. Bat son
is a three-part inquiry...

6

JUDGE DAVIS:

Right.

ATP:

... and you have to then use all three parts. If it's a three-part test....

8

JUDGE DAVIS:

Right.

9

ATP:

.. .you don't simply use two parts. The burden of persuasion, the burden
of proving actual discriminatory intent is on the defendant. And I

11

analogize it to this: In a criminal case the burden of persuasion is always

12

on the State. Now, the defense may put on a good defense, they may put

13

on a poor defense, they may remain silent; but the case still is going to

14

proceed, assuming that the State made its prima facie case.

15

JUDGE DAVIS:

But you're saying that that burden essentially picks up and places the

16

responsibility on the defense attorney to see to it that the court gets to step

17

three then.

18

ATP:

Absolutely.

19

JUDGE DAVIS:

Isn't that your argument?

20

ATI

Yes. Well, it places it for all purposes, it places it to make an adequate

21

record, which this Court actually recognized, it places the burden on them

22

to raise the objection, it places the burden on them to make sure that all

23

facts that they wish to argue - whether that is facts that they are presenting

14

1

or whether that is facts that they are claiming dispute - be explanations

2

given by the prosecutor, it's their responsibility. It is their motion. There

3

is no presumption that a peremptory strike was discriminatory. The

4

presumption is that the peremptory strike was proper. And unless and

5

until they carry their burden of persuasion and actually proceed to step

6

three and get an actual resolution of that question of whether or not the

7

strike was in fact exercised with purposeful discrimination, there is no

8

Batson violation.

9

JUDGE DAVIS:

So it's broader than a fact inquiry? It picks up the process, the

10

responsibility, if you will, of making sure that the court reaches step three

11

and rules on it.

12

ATP:

Yes.

13

JUDGE DAVIS:

Okay.

14

JUDGE MCHUGH: From our perspective reviewing it, if the step-two phase, there is no

15

explanation from the prosecutor or the explanations are vague or not

16

specifically tied to this case, I assume that you would agree that in

17

determining how much discretion we would give the trial court in making

18

it's step-three analysis, we would look at what did or didn't come in on the

19

step-two analysis. And if that's weak it's going to affect how we review

20

it?

21

ATP:

I don't think that it affects the discretion, but it does affect the whole

22

assessment of step three. Step-three is a pot, and in that pot goes all the

23

circumstances involving the voir dire. In the pot goes the strength or

15

weakness ofthe prima facie case, whether or not the State challenged it or
not, the facts alleged in the prima facie case go into the step-three pot.
Additionally the prosecutor's explanations or lack of explanations, go into
the step-three pot. So in the circumstance that the explanations are weak
or that there's no explanations given, that certainly is a circumstance that
needs to be considered, just as the strength or weakness of'the prima facie
case is a circumstance that needs to be considered. But additionally, what
else goes into the pot? Pretty much anything else that has to do with the
voir dire, including the court's own observations, including the court's
assessment of the credibility of the defendant, including in such cases as
Miller El, if there is a pattern or a policy of discrimination that is being
promoted by that office. So all of these go into the pot. But step-three
itself is a factual finding.
The issue of whether a strike was exercised with discriminatory
intent is a factual finding that is not disputed by the defendant. And
because if s a factual finding and because it is so dependent upon the
observations of the trial court and the assessment by the trial court of the
credibility of the prosecutor, because what you're really asking is the trial
court to determine motivation. They are supposed to look at every fact
that they know and say, "Well, has the defense carried their burden to
show that there was a gap in the illegal motivation?"
[inaudible] version is sounding a little bit like this may well have been the
court's responsibility to go to step three.

16

ATP:

Well, he did go to step three, Your Honor, in this case. He fully resolved
this issue and went to step-three.

JUDGE DAVIS:

But this was after the fact, after the jury had been sworn, right?

ATP:

Yes.

JUDGE DAVIS:

Okay.

A'.

Yes, well, and I perfectly agree that in the ideal world obviously we want
everybody to do their jobs. I certainly don't dispute that. Everybody
should be doing their jobs and frankly the prosecutor could have also
stepped up. That is true, Your Honor. But ultimately because it is their

10

motion, and because it is their claim, and because they do carry the

11

burden, it is primarily the defendant's responsibility and he has the

12

greatest advantage and the only advantage by not allowing it to be

13

resolved, because this is structural error. By not allowing it to be resolved

14

he has planted error then, that the only recourse if this Court found that

15

there was a Batson violation....

16

JUDGED A VIS:

And your argument bumps up a little bit into the area of the invited error,
almost, doesn't it?

17

18

ATP:

Yes, it docs.

19

JUDGE DAVIS:

Okay.

20

ATP:

I sec that my lime is up, thank you.

21

JUDGE BENCH:

Thank you for your argument. Two minutes, Ms. Jones.

22

ATD:

Thank you, Your Honor. The Balson process is intended to give

23

transparency to the prosecutor's reasons for removing specific veniremen

17

1

from the jury panel; it is raised in the heat of trial, it is something done on

2

the fly. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it a very straight-forward test,

3

and in Miller-El v. Dretke the United States Supreme Court has said that

4

parties and courts should be well familiar with Bats on by now.

5

The U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. Valdez and the Utah

6

Supreme Court - I'm sorry, Johnson v. California, and the Utah Supreme

7

Court in Valdez - indicated that if, if the prosecutor's explanations are

8

sufficient, then you move on to step three. Well we have to assume that

9

the other part of that statement is true - if the prosecutor's statements and

10

explanations are not sufficient, step three ought to be quite clear to the trial

11

court.

12

To be sufficient the prosecutor's explanations must be neutral,

13

related to the case, clear and specific, and legitimate. In addition, in

14

Miller-El v. Dretke the Court stated that the prosecutor should understand

15

by now that he will stand or fall on his own explanations. The whole jury

16

panel will stand or fall on that prosecutor's explanations. If they're not

17

legitimate then the prosecutor's explanations fall. In J.E.B. the United

18

States Supreme Court said that the explanations must be exceedingly

19

persuasive. Here the prosecutor's explanations were not. He remained

20

ignorant about Mr. Worley's education, and yet used that as a basis to

21

strike him. He stated that he struck Mr. Tidwell because of a gut instinct;

22

and he struck Mr, Jensen because of a personal opinion. Those

23

explanations are vague, illegitimate, ambiguous and problematic. The

18

1

prosecutor's explanations here were not sufficient to allow the court to

2

proceed with trial in light of the Batson violations. And for that reason we

3

ask this Court to reverse the trial court.

4

JUDGE BENCH:

Thank you both for your excellent arguments this morning. Yet another

5

interesting case and we'll take this matter under advisement and let you

6

know by written decision, and we'll be adjourned for the day.
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